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Abstract 
This article offers an overview of the development of Canadian ports, with a 
particular focus on the impact of the container trade.  The goal is to highlight the 
international context within which Canadian port development occurs and identify 
the attributes for port success in our dynamic global trade environment.  The 
article begins with a discussion of the growth and extent of the container industry 
and the impact on trade corridors, as considered from the perspective of ports 
and intermodal systems.  Opportunities for Canadian ports to serve the growing 
North American container trade are outlined, and the paper concludes with an 
overview of the key elements crucial for the success of Canadian ports. 
 
Canada and the Global Economy2 
Increasingly efficient international maritime transportation underlies the global economy’s 
phenomenal growth.   Reduced freight rates stemming from economies of scale in 
containerization and other forms of specialized maritime transport have enabled major 
companies to internationalize their activities.  Economic globalization implies international firms 
can source raw materials and assemble components and finished products in various low cost 
locations throughout the world.  The minimum cost of maritime transportation, primarily focused 
on containerization, coupled with reductions in national tariffs and trade barriers through 
international trade liberalization policies has fueled the growth of global economic activities 
(Levinson, 2006). 
One economic forecaster suggests that Asia-North American trade growth is likely to slow 
during 2007-08 as China invests in its own public infrastructure and meeting growing domestic 
demand.  In addition, the declining housing market in the US is dampening consumer 
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confidence reducing the demand for imports (Pierce, 2006). Canada’s Export Development 
Corporation is predicting a similar global economic slow down beginning in the US and 
spreading like “falling dominoes” throughout the rest of the world (Poloz, 2006). This should lead 
to a “normalization” of the global economy resulting in a more stable economic situation.  This 
slowdown or “downgrade’ of the world economy will lead to reduced commodity prices and 
increased difficulties for Canadian exporters.  Added to exporters’ woes will be the continued 
high value of the Canadian dollar as our currency is linked to higher oil prices.  Canadian 
exports are expected to remain flat in 2007-08 due to the economic downturn in our main 
trading partner, the US (Poloz, 2007).  However, despite these predictions of an economic slow 
down in the west, China’s economy continues to surge forward.  Its rapid growth is fueling fears 
of inflation in the Chinese economy (York, 2006). 
As an indicator of how international trade underlies world economic output, the volume of world 
exports continued to expand in 2006.  As shown in Table 1, for developed countries, North 
America led in export growth at 8.5 percent, followed by the EU at 7.5 percent.  In developing 
countries, exports from Asia amounted to 13.5 percent in 2006 of which China recorded a 
remarkable 22 percent.  China recorded high import growth levels at 16.5 percent (reflecting its 
growing demand for raw materials to supply their expanding export manufacturing activities). 
Table 1:  Annual Export and Import Growth of Volumes of Goods, 2004-2006 (percentage) 
Exports Imports  
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
World 8 6 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
- North America 8 6 8.5 10.5 6.5 6.5 
- European Union 7 4 7.5 6.5 3.5 6.5 
Asia 15.5 11.5 13.5 14.5 8 8.5 
- China 24 25 22 21.5 11.5 16.5 
Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2007, Table 2, p. 4 
Table 1 reflects strong world trade growth.   However, the vast majority of Canadian exports and 
imports are continentally based in trading with the US.  On a value basis, Canadian exports to 
the US increased in 2005 by 12.3 percent, to $US 288 billion, representing 84 percent of total 
exports.  Imports from the US rose by 11.3 percent to $US 211 billion, representing 57 percent 
of total Canadian imports (AAPA, 2006). 
Most of Canada’s continental trade with the US is transported by surface rather than marine 
mode.  In 2005, marine transportation carried $19.7 billion worth of Canadian commodities 
to/from the US, with exports to the US comprising the major trade: $17.7 billion, or less than 6% 
of the total.  Marine trade with the US in 2005 amounted to only 15 percent of total Canadian 
marine imports and exports by value.  However, on a tonnage basis, transborder trade with the 
US amounted to 39 percent of total marine trade, demonstrating that much of our trade with the 
US is low value bulk commodities (iron ore, potash, sulfur, oil and wood products) rather than 
higher value general cargo in containers (Transport Canada, 2006). 
Thus, at least three conclusions can be highlighted:  despite consistent growth in the global 
economy, Canada remains dependent on the American market; Canada’s best options to 








diversify are with Asia; and while there are opportunities to pursue greater trade with Asia, an 
economic slowdown may have an impact on this trade in the near future. 
Global Seaborne Trade 
Global international trade growth has been reflected in the expansion of the world’s fleet of 
ships – both in terms of numbers and size.  Table 2 outlines the development of international 
seaborne trade in terms of the tonnes of goods loaded over the past three decades.  As shown 
in Table 2, total goods loaded have increased by more than 289 percent in this 36-year period. 
Table 2 also shows the shift in goods being transported with dry goods (bulk, break-bulk and 
containerized general cargoes) increasing from less than half to almost two thirds of the total 
volume of international trade; reflecting the growth of world manufacturing output. 
 
Table 2:  International Seaborne Trade (goods loaded - million tonnes) 
Tanker Cargo Dry Cargo  
Year Tonnage % of Total Tonnage % of Total 
 
Total 
1970 1,442 56 1,124 44 2,566 
1980 1,871 51 1,833 49 3,704 
1990 1,755 44 2,253 56 4,008 
2000 2,163 35 3,821 64 5,983 
2006 2,674 36 4,442 64 7,416 
Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2007, Table 3, p. 4 
 
Canadian maritime traffic includes domestic and international trade.  Table 3 outlines Canada’s 
marine traffic in 2000 and 2005.  As shown, the total Canadian marine trade of 464 million 
tonnes in 2005 is about 6.5 percent of the world’s total seaborne trade. 
 








1994 104 79 168 351 
2000 109 109 185 403 
2005 139 127.4 197.8 464 
 Source: Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2006, Table 8-16, p. 82 
 








Global Maritime Fleet   
As expected with continued world trade growth, the global maritime fleet has increased over the 
years as shown in Table 4.  By 2007, the fleet size had increased by 58 percent in dead weight 
tonnage over a 17-year period. Table 4 also shows the decline in general cargo vessels (break-
bulk commodities – decrease 2 percent) being offset with an increase in specialized cellular 
container ship tonnage – an increase of 392 over the past two decades. Table 4 outlines the 
significance of the liquid and dry bulk trades in terms of the world fleet.  In 2007, bulk ships 
comprised about 72 percent of the global fleet.     
The growth of the world fleet has been fueled by: 
• Increases in energy and mineral cargoes (liquid and dry bulks) derived from a 
growing demand for these raw materials from North America, Europe, Japan and 
more recently, China. 
• Economic globalization reflecting the international division of production and 
enhanced trade liberalization. 
• Technical improvements in ship and marine terminals facilitating increased 
productivity and lower freight costs in moving goods (e.g. containerization). 
• Economies of scale being achieved from larger ships enabling maritime transport to 
remain a low cost mode of moving goods. 
 
Table 4:  World Fleet by Principle Vessel Types (Thousands of dwt) 
Year Oil 
tankers 
Dry bulk General 
cargo 
Container Other Total 
1990 246 235 103 26 49 659 
2000 285 265 100 75 74 799 
2007 383 368 101 128 63 1043 
% Change 
1990 – 2007 
55% 57% -2% 392% 29% 58% 
Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2007, Table 5, pp. 24 
 
The global marine fleet is comprised of a variety of specialized ships including: 
• Bulk carriers are purpose built ships.  These are designed to carry specific 
commodities.  They can be classified into liquid bulk and dry bulk vessels.  Bulk 
ships include the largest vessels afloat.  The largest tankers, the Ultra large Crude 
Carriers (ULCC) are up to 500,000 deadweight tonnes (dwt).  The more typical 
tanker size is between 250,000 to 350,000 dwt (VLCCs).  The largest dry bulk 








carriers are about 350,000 dwt with the more typical size being between 100,000 to 
150,000 dwt. 
• General cargo ships.  These are designed to carry non-bulk cargoes.  Traditional 
break-bulk general cargo ships were about 10,000 dwt due to slow loading and 
unloading times in handling such labour-intensive small package cargoes.  Over the 
past three decades, general cargo ships have been replaced by purpose-built, 
cellular container vessels.  Container ships load and unload their cargo quickly 
gaining efficiency by handling unitized commodities.  The largest container ships are 
100,000 dwt and larger.  Normally container ship sizes are measured by their 
container carrying capacity in TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units – a forty foot 
container is equivalent to two TEU).  The largest container ship to date is Maersk’s 
recently launched Emma Maersk with a reputed carrying capacity of more than 
14,000 TEU. 
• Roll on-Roll off (ro-ro) vessels.  These are designed to allow cars, trucks and trailers 
to be driven directly on board.  Originally used as ferries, larger ro-ro vessels now 
operate on deep-sea trade routes.  The largest ro-ro vessels are car carriers that 
transport vehicles from assembly plants around the world to their main markets. 
• Passenger and cruise ships.  The former tend to be smaller vessels while the latter 
are usually large capacity ships, today exceeding 150,000+ gross registered tonnes.   
Trade Corridors and Gateways 
As a result of the earlier Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US and the subsequent North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that included Mexico, Canada’s trade increasingly 
moved north-south rather than the more traditional east-west orientation.  By the mid-1990s, 
north-south intermodal railway traffic surpassed east-west movements.  CN Rail’s US 
acquisitions in the 1990s reflected this shift in trade in obtaining rail access through the central 
parts of the US into northern Mexico (McMillan, 2006).  The north-side trade shift led to the 
development of numerous trade corridor promotion organizations across the continent.   
Trade corridors have been defined as “streams of products, services and information moving 
within and through communities in geographic patterns” (Van Pelt, 2003). Another approach 
considers “North American trade corridors as strategies developed by business and municipal 
(and sometimes state and even federal) government leaders to attract to particular regions 
some of the increased flow of materials generated by deepening North American economic 
integration” (Blank, 2006). 
During the past decade, governments paid considerable attention to trade corridors with a view 
towards providing significant public investment in designated corridors to facilitate trade.  Most 
of the proposed north-south trade corridors link US Interstate Highways with their Canadian 
counterparts.  In 1991, the US envisioned an integrated system of superhighways supported by 
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA).   The political process soon 
intervened with Congress quickly adding to the number of designated high priority corridors in 
subsequent legislation such that they now cross the country in a maze of routings.  Other than 








some improvements in selected border crossings, little has been achieved.  A coherent, rational 
integrated North American highway system has yet to be developed (Blank, 2006). 
 
Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative 
In the Canadian context, the first successful gateway is the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor 
Initiative focused on the British Columbia and Prairie hinterlands of lower BC mainland, Prince 
Rupert and the ports’ hinterlands.  The Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative has received over $860 
million in federal funding supplementing provincial, municipal and private support to develop and 
enhance essential transportation infrastructure.  Some $2.3 billion has been provided for 
transportation infrastructure projects in BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Emerson, 
2008). The aim of the Initiative is to reduce congestion and ease the flow of goods in and out of 
the major ports of Vancouver, Fraser River and Prince Rupert.  On January 1, 2008, as part of 
the Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative, the federal government enabled the three Vancouver area 
port authorities (Vancouver, Fraser River and North Fraser River) to amalgamate into one unit – 
the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority.  
At a recent Association Canadian Port Authorities “Ports/Government Interface Conference”, 
Transport Canada’s Director-General of Strategic Policy, B. Bohunicky, pointed out “the next 
round of productivity will come through the greater integration of the transportation modes.”  
Such Gateway integration requires private and public sector cooperation and coordination.  To 
obtain federal government support for new Gateways, “they must offer a clear, coherent vision.”  
The presentation outlined six key themes that the federal government is looking for in Gateway 
creation: 
1. International commerce and trade competitiveness: Looking to the emerging 
superpowers such as China and their impact on the West Coast, gateways are not 
considered by the federal government to be overarching infrastructure models; rather 
gateways are expected to be targeted strategically to key opportunities. 
2. Global supply chains: While efficient transportation systems are crucial to 
Canadian trade, other non-transportation issues along the supply chain must also be 
addressed.  Gateways provide a framework for concerted strategic action. 
3. Policy integration:  The need to address interconnected issues to ensure 
coherence in dealing with interacting factors such as border crossings, security, land 
use, taxation policies, human resources and so forth. 
4. Multilevel partnerships:  The Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative was driven by private 
sector leaders who championed an integrated approach (the public-private 
partnership model).  Such a partnership is a precondition for establishing a gateway.  
This is seen as a horizontal policy challenge – developing clear collaboration across 
federal/provincial/municipal "silos." 
5. Productivity gain:  The need to address how the gateway will increase productivity 








in the transportation sector.  The next economic productivity gain will likely come 
from a greater integration across transportation modes. 
6. Communities and regions: A convergence of geography, commerce and 
transportation in urban regions leads to the need to address urban transportation 
congestion and environmental concerns.  In turn, this creates concerns about quality 
of life in urban areas, land use, and the impact of global economic dynamics on local 
areas (Bohunicky, 2006). 
The Role of Ports 
Seaports often have two distinct roles: serving as terminals and as nodes.  As a terminal, 
cargoes arrive or depart the port as their final destination or initial origin.  For example, crude oil 
shipments to the Irving Refinery involve the Port of Saint John in New Brunswick as a terminal 
as this imported raw material is refined locally and then shipped to other destinations by various 
modes.  In its role as a node in the global logistics supply chain, ports provide the interface 
between transportation modes from deep-sea vessels to feeder ships or to landside transport 
(road and rail) for onward movement of goods to their final destination.  The future movement of 
containers through the Port of Prince Rupert to the US Midwest underlies the port’s key role as 
a node in the supply chain from Asia to North America.  
Developing a modern comprehensive port requires it to focus on both roles.  Ports need to 
secure bulk commodities to supply local industries encouraging economic activity while serving 
broader national and regional interests as a node for the transshipment of goods to/from inland 
destinations.  As a terminal, Canadian ports support regional economic development, serving as 
an “engine of growth” as required in their federally legislated objectives.  In their nodal role, 
ports interact with inland transport providers to complement and coordinate their efforts to move 
goods from the waterside to the landside as efficiently as possible.   
Canada Port Authorities 
The objectives of Canada’s major ports have been outlined by the Association of Canadian Port 
Authorities: 
Canada’s major ports have a legal designation under the Canada Marine Act 
(CMA) as Canada Port Authorities (CPA) and consist of 19 Port Authorities 
known as the National Ports System. These Port Authorities were designated as 
being ‘critical to domestic and international trade.’ These 19 ports handle more 
than half of all Canadian marine cargo at approximately 240 million tonnes 
annually, valued at more than $100 billion dollars. 
The balance of Canadian marine cargo represents 200 million tonnes of cargo 
handled by an equally important regional ports system consisting of several 
hundred ports from Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic. 
Canada Port Authorities were created by an Act of Parliament in 1998 under the 








Canada Marine Act (CMA), providing an overall governance structure for the 
management of Port Authorities with important local governance and control. 
The key elements of the new, autonomous structure include:  
 
• requiring Port Authorities to be fully ‘commercial’ and completely ‘self-
sufficient’ with no further funding from the Government of Canada, 
• setting strict borrowing limits for Port Authorities with operations funded solely 
from the CPA’s stream of revenues with no ability to pledge assets to borrow, 
and 
• requiring Port Authorities to provide a portion of their gross revenues to the 
Government of Canada’s general revenue fund (ACPA, 2008). 
Canada Marine Act Reviewi  
During the 1990's, the federal government undertook a comprehensive port reform process 
resulting in the Canada Marine Act 1998 (CMA).  In establishing a National Port System (NPS) 
comprised of the 19 Canada Port Authorities (CPA), the CMA did not adequately address the 
need to make these major ports business-like in their competitive setting.  The CMA retains 
considerable federal control in the regulation and governance of port authorities.  The CMA 
reflects several elements of the federal government’s earlier National Airport System (NAS).  
The NAS led to the long-term leasing of the government’s 26 national airports to local non-profit 
Canadian airport authorities.  However, a significant divergence between the airport model and 
the ports system lies in their governance systems.  Locally appointed directors at Canadian 
airport authorities are independent and have full autonomy to manage their facilities.  In the 
ports’ case, almost all directors are appointed by federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Transport (with user group representatives being selected from a list of proposed 
nominees, if the Minister chooses to do so).  There are also restrictions in the CMA making 
various qualified individuals ineligible to serve as port directors.   
Beyond these important port governance issues, the CMA restricts, to a degree, the CPAs’ 
ability to diversify to take advantage of revenue generating opportunities in non-port related 
endeavors.  From a financial perspective, the CMA precludes CPAs from using federal lands 
and assets as collateral for commercial loans.  The CMA established CPAs as federal agents 
rather than their former status of Crown agencies.  As federal agents, CPAs are not funded by 
government but rather are expected to borrow from commercial lenders.  More recent legal 
interpretations suggest the Crown may be ultimately responsible for CPA borrowing obligations.  
Hence, to limit potential federal liabilities, restrictive borrowing ceiling caps have been placed on 
ports.  These actions limit the CPAs’ ability to raise capital for port investments.  As federal 
agents, CPAs are exempt from various taxes, but they are required to make payments-in-lieu of 
taxes [PILT] to adjacent municipalities - a concern for former Harbour Commissions that were 
converted to CPAs as they had not paid grants-in-lieu of taxes in the past. 








As commercial enterprises, major Canadian ports need to operate freely, unfettered by the 
constraints of federal reporting relationships and bureaucratic red-tape.  They need to be able to 
devise innovative and creative responses to the many challenges facing them.  Competitive 
flexibility and adaptability in the North American continental transportation system requires 
autonomous and independent commercial ports.  The port reform reflected in the CMA sought 
to free CPAs from federal control and regulation, but this was only achieved to a limited degree.   
The need to further untie major Canadian ports from the strictures of the federal government 
can be best exemplified by the restrictions to their commercial freedoms in the CMA.  
Restrictions on CPAs emerged from the actions of Transport Canada, Treasury Board, and the 
Department of Finance in their attempt to protect the federal interest.  These restrictions and 
added regulations include CPA conformance to freedom of information legislation (this has 
created a privacy concern for commercially-oriented ports), environmental assessment, the 
Official Languages Act, and quarterly business plan reports to Treasury Board.  These federal 
requirements were incorporated in the CMA despite the detrimental effects they might have on 
the CPAs commercial operations.  Earlier, the Port of Montreal's CEO suggested, “the 
legislation [Canada Marine Act] needs clarification and improvement, because as it currently 
stands it is more restrictive than what we have already on operational and responsibility 
matters” (Taddeo, 1996).  
But what is really needed for Canadian ports?  In the face of continental and global competition, 
a more radical alternative is required.  Canada Port Authorities must be unshackled from federal 
government strictures and allowed to operate freely in a competitive and business-like manner.  
This may sound radical in the current Canadian context, but it is important to reflect on port 
reform lessons from other countries.  From a global perspective, port reform has led to a clear 
shift to the economic right.  Many ports have moved from their former status as comprehensive 
agents - where the port as a public agency is provided with all services including dock labour – 
towards a landlord model, in which port lands are leased to private terminal operators.  This 
landlord model is now used in most Canadian ports.  Commercialization, corporatization and 
privatization are now the operational codes (Ircha, 1999). 
The CMA reinforces the commercialized nature of the major ports.  But is this enough?  To be 
truly competitive with their US counter-parts, Canadian ports need to shift further to the 
economic right.  Incorporating Canadian ports as “for-profit” companies would allow them to act 
independently and autonomously as a truly commercial business.  Over time, as independent 
port corporations gain competitive experience and become financially viable, the next logical 
step would be to consider their privatization. 
In June 2003, following a year of hearings across the country, the Canada Marine Act Review 
Panel recommended substantial changes to the CMA reflecting many of the major issues raised 
by the Association of Canadian Port Authorities (ACPA).  The Review Panel’s recommendations 
included many steps to further liberalize CPA operations and deal with their funding challenges.  
In the latter case, the Review Panel recommended that CPAs be able to access federal funding, 
increase their borrowing limits, establish financing alternatives for new port infrastructure such 
as tax-exempt bonds, changing the manner in which ports provide stipends to the federal 
government and so forth (Transport Canada, 2003).  Despite their many strong 








recommendations in favour of further liberalizing CPAs, the federal government has taken little 
action.   
The ACPA has continued to lobby for federal adoption of five major CMA policy 
changes:  
• allowing increased capital borrowing limits for ports, 
• enabling CPAs to access federal funding in a manner similar to other commercial 
enterprises, 
• improving the current lengthy process for transferring federal lands to CPAs, 
• having the federal government undertake payments in lieu of taxes on behalf of 
CPAs for federal port lands, and 
• switching the basis of annual stipends paid by CPAs from a percentage of gross 
revenue to net revenue.   
Recently, the CMA was amended to adopt the first three of these policy initiatives. In addition, 
the federal government is enabling CPA mergers as discussed above, another Review Panel 
recommendation. 
Container Trade Growth in West Coast Ports 
Growing container traffic in the past several years has had an impact on Vancouver and other 
major US West Coast ports.  Port congestion and subsequent delays in moving containers has 
been experienced in the intermodal road and rail connections from Vancouver’s Deltaport and 
other container terminals in the Burrard Inlet, and almost reached crisis proportions in major US 
West Coast ports.  In the Vancouver area, intermodal congestion led CN and CP to take the 
unprecedented step of cooperating with each other in sharing regional rail line capacity to move 
containers and other freight more efficiently.  In the US, considerable investment was made to 
improve intermodal movements through congested urban areas.  One such project is the 
Alameda Corridor in California, an investment of more than $2.4 billion to provide a container 
movement corridor for road and rail from the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to inland 
transfer stations.  Despite this major infrastructure investment, Los Angeles and Long Beach still 
face serious port congestion and continuously seek innovative steps to enhance their overall 
productivity.   
A recent forecast of US container port utilization shows that the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach are operating at almost full capacity in 2006 (at 88 percent and 91 percent respectively) 
(MergeGlobal, 2007).  It is expected that these ports will be unable to handle an anticipated 
increase of container throughputs in future years.  Other US West Coast ports are also reaching 
their capacity limits.  This means that without future investment in significant container terminal 
expansions, further congestion and the subsequent diversion of Asian containers to East Coast 
ports will be a certainty.    








One method of addressing congestion is to reduce container dwell time in terminals.  By limiting 
free container storage time, shippers have a financial incentive to remove their containers from 
the terminal more quickly.  Reducing free storage increases container yard capacity thus 
supporting higher throughputs.  Unlike many major ports around the world, not all US and 
Canadian ports operate on a 24/7 basis.  The lack of round-the-clock operations, in particular 
through the gates, reduces container throughput efficiency and productivity.  In a step to reduce 
gate congestion and increase productivity, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach introduced 
a new “PierPass” program.  In this program containers coming to and leaving terminals by road 
during peak hours are charged a $40-per-TEU fee.  Terminal operators are encouraged to open 
their gates for truck movements during off-peak hours, when no fee applies.  This form of 
demand management creates an incentive to spread peak loads through the terminal gates. 
The PierPass program has improved port container handling efficiency.  As pointed out by the 
executive director of the Marine exchange of Southern California, M. Aschemeyer, “PierPass 
has been an unqualified success in moving trucks through the terminals day and night” 
(Johnson, 2006a).  The port of Vancouver has initiated a truck licensing system to regulate 
container movement through its terminals, as well as to initiate a number of environmental and 
safety measures.   While the port currently has an ad hoc system of extended terminal gate 
hours, they are seeking to introduce a 24/7 operation to coordinate all terminal movements 
(Kulisch, 2007a).  
Much of the North American and European container trade growth comes from the rapid 
emergence of China as a major manufacturing and trading nation.  The trans-Pacific pendulum 
trade from Asia to the West Coast of North America is booming.  The alternative pendulum 
routing from Asia via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean to the East Coast of North America 
is also experiencing trade growth, and provides another alternative to port congestion. Various 
East Coast ports including Halifax and New York are actively marketing the Suez routing (the 
so-called ‘Suez Express’) for Asian trade to North America.  It is this alternative container 
routing from India, Asia and China that is partly driving the Atlantic Gateway initiative, 
particularly for the port of Halifax and the proposed container terminal in the Canso Strait area.   
However, the Suez container routing opportunity may be short lived due to the impending 
development of an enlarged Panama Canal.  A recent Panamanian referendum supported the 
construction of a $5.25 billion enlarged canal designed to serve the growing number of 
container ships that are too large for the existing Panama Canal.  The new canal locks will be 
sized to serve ships as large as 12,000 TEU carrying capacity.  The threat to Canada’s East 
Coast ports is that, “the new canal will allow more cargo to be carried on big ships from the Far 
East to ports along the US East and Gulf coasts.  That could help ease congestion on the US 
West Cast and still allow carriers and shippers to reap the benefits of the economies of scale big 
ships provide.” (Dupin, 2006)  Southern US ports are already gearing up to meet the challenge 
of additional container ship routing through an enlarged Panama Canal (Dow, 2007). 
The anticipated growth in container shipments to North America continues to cause concern.  
As pointed out by D. Tilden, President of Marine Terminals, in order to handle the annual growth 
in North American container throughput, a port the size of New York – New Jersey would have 
to be added each year.  He further indicated that port congestion in the future is likely to be 
sustained and systemic: 








PierPass has brought in extra capacity, but there’s limited potential for more 
diversions from L.A. and Long Beach, except for Oakland, which has capacity.  
And, frankly, other options like alternative gateways won’t be online of ’06.  All 
the Greenfield sites in the U.S. and Mexico, if they were all available in the next 
three years, would barely be able to handle the growth of the next three years 
(Johnson, 2006b). 
 
There is continued concern in the ports and logistics industry about the growing disparity 
between Chinese and North American port and inland infrastructure development.  China’s 
economy continues to grow rapidly with significant new ports and logistics infrastructure being 
built while North American ports, the destination of much of China’s exports, are struggling to 
cope due to the lack of investment capital as well as the constraints posed by urban and 
environmental concerns. 
Larger Container Ships 
Over the years, the size of container ships has continued to increase as shipping companies 
sought economies of scale from bigger vessels in a highly competitive market.  As container 
ships get larger, there are limits to the ports they can serve due to physical constraints of water 
depth, channel widths and size of turning basins as well as the capacity of the ports’ cargo 
handling equipment and their productivity.  In the future, due to these physical limitations, mega-
sized container ships of 12,000+ TEU capacities will likely only serve a small number of 
designated ports in North America as the terminus to their eastern and western pendulum 
swings from Asia. 
Container ships continue to grow larger.  Post-Panamax sized 6,000+ TEU vessels are now 
commonplace in the major trade routes serving Asia.  At present, the largest container ship 
afloat is the Emma Maersk, the first of a series of eight “PS-class” ships christened in 
September 2006.  The Emma Maersk, at nearly 400 meters long, 56 meters wide and with a 
draft of 15.5 meters can carry 14,800 TEU, although Maersk Lines rates her as an 11,000 TEU 
vessel (Phillips, 2006).  With a beam of 56 meters, the Emma Maersk and her PS-class 
counterparts are too wide for even the future enlarged Panama Canal. 
Building larger ships is becoming commonplace.  The summer of 2007 witnessed a whirlwind of 
orders for new mega-sized ships. The world’s third largest container carrier, the French line 
CMA CGM, placed an order for eight 11,400 TEU vessels at a reported cost of $1.2 billion. In 
August, COSCO ordered eight 13,100 TEU ships to be built for delivery in 2011.  This was soon 
followed by Zim Lines’ order for eight 12,600 TEU ships for delivery in 2012.  There are 114 
container ships of 10,000+ TEU on order including 52 of them of 12,000+ TEU.  This rapid 
growth of mega-sized ships arises for the shipping lines continued quest for economies of scale.  
These large ships can save 10 to 15 percent of the sea part of the voyage, but such savings 
may be limited due to port inefficiencies causing the ships to remain too long in port and from 
higher feeder vessel costs (Heaney, 2007). 








The global container fleet continues to expand; although some shipping lines are becoming 
concerned that projected capacity will outstrip the growth of container traffic.  A recent estimate 
showed that the global containership fleet capacity is expected to grow by 76 percent from 2005 
to 2010 compared to an anticipated container traffic growth of 41 percent (Clancy and Hoppin, 
2006).  In this same period, the percentage of the global containership fleet of 7,500 TEU+ is 
expected to expand from 5.3 percent in 2005 to 17 percent in 2010. 
These increasingly larger container ships require: 
• deeper and wider approach channels and berths,  
• wider turning basins,  
• bigger container terminals with significantly more land-side storage capacity to 
handle larger volumes of import and export containers,  
• higher and longer out-reach, automated ship-to-shore gantry cranes, and  
• a highly efficient labor force working 24/7 to ensure rapid ship turn-around. 
The maximum size for container ships is predicted to be about 18,000 TEU, based on depth 
limits in the Malacca Strait (the main Asia-Europe shipping channel between Indonesia and 
Malaysia) (Blenkey, 2006).  Such a ship would have a length of about 470 meters, a beam of 60 
meters and a draft of about 18 meters. 
It is anticipated that much of the mega-sized container fleet will be deployed on the Asia-Europe 
trade route rather than the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trades.  This is due mainly to higher 
port productivity in the Asia-Europe trade route and their ability to quickly turn-around these 
larger vessels.  Thus it will be unlikely that North American ports will see many of these new 
builds in the near future.   However, larger container ships “cascaded” from the Asia-Europe 
routes will continue to serve North American ports.  
The key question is where will major North American container ports be located? An earlier 
study by Gustaaf de Monie suggested that a global fleet of 15,000 TEU vessels would likely 
need only four major hub ports to serve them – one in South-East Asia (likely Singapore or 
Malaysia for transshipment to the rest of Asia), one in the Mediterranean to transship to Europe, 
and one on each of the East and West Coasts of North America (1996). Feeder vessels and 
other intermodal systems would distribute containers to/from these four major transshipment 
hub ports.  The study went further to propose an offshore island be built off the US East Coast 
as a major transshipment facility.  Subsequently, the container terminal in Freeport in the 
Bahamas has positioned itself as the southern US “off shore island” container hub port by 
adding deep-water container ship handling capacity.  Freeport’s container throughput increased 
from about 11,000 TEU in the mid-1990’s to over 1.1 million in 2005.  
In response to de Monie’s off shore island proposal, another study suggests there are sufficient 
suitable deep-water ports in Canada to readily serve North American container movements 
(Ircha, 2001).  These Canadian ports include: Vancouver and Prince Rupert on the West Coast 
and Halifax, Saint John, the Strait of Canso area and Sept Îles on the East Coast. 








During the past two decades, the “hub and spoke” model container transshipment was the 
generally accepted approach.  However, an analysis of ship routing suggests this model has not 
fully developed.  Instead, ship routing has become increasingly complex.  This analysis showed 
that from 1992-2002 there was an increase in the number of ports having direct calls from top-
tier container lines.  In this period, 22 new ports were added including 18 in Asia (Meyrick, 
2004).  The complexity of ship routing and the addition of new ports rather than port 
consolidation arose from several factors including: operating costs, the need for cargo balance, 
container repositioning requirements, transit time demand, service frequency requirements 
between major centers, and the need to retain key customer accounts by providing them with 
frequent and high level service. 
In today’s increasingly security conscious world, the use of non-urban and more isolated major 
container transshipment ports may become the norm in the future.  Locating such hubs outside 
of major urban areas may be prudent to enable container inspection to occur in secure areas.  
Hence the more remote, Canadian deep-water ports such as Prince Rupert may serve 
tomorrow’s North American need for new container hub ports.   
Recent terminal congestion problems and other difficulties relating to labour relations and inland 
intermodal services in North American ports have led many shippers and shipping lines to 
diversify their port options in choosing to use more than one hub port.  New York’s port 
commerce director has stated: 
We now have 24 strings of all-water services calling in our port.  That’s happened 
because shippers are saying to ocean carriers, “I don’t want all my cargo going 
through one place.  I need to be much more comfortable as far as redundancy 
and reliability are concerned.”  This clearly is a trend no one can dispute (Mottley, 
2005).  
In the future, we will likely see more rather than fewer major container terminals along both 
coasts of North America providing container security in non-urban, more isolated locations and 
offering port diversity to shipping lines to ensure delivery reliability.  This trend offers a 
significant opportunity to existing and proposed Canadian ports.    
Impacts on Ports 
Major shifts in the container trade have impacted container terminals around the world.  Some 
ports retained and expanded their hub port status, while others have been relegated to feeder 
port or niche port roles.  Some of the key elements impacting Canadian container ports and 
impeding port expansion include: port congestion, security, urban development and 
environmental concerns. 
Port Security 
The growing demand for port security under the International Maritime Organization’s 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS) may reduce terminal productivity and 
efficiency.  Security concerns in the US have been heightened to the point where there is 
considerable fear of terrorist attack via containers.  This concern led to several US container 








related security programs.  These include the Container Security Initiative (CSI) through which 
electronically submitted cargo manifests for all vessels inbound for the US or Canada must be 
filed 24 hours prior to loading containers at port of origin.  US customs officials have been 
assigned to various international ports (on a reciprocal basis) to pre-check in-bound shipments.  
In addition, the US initiated Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a 
voluntary program in parallel with CSI.  Under C-TPAT importers and carriers (shipping lines, 
rail and air) apply to participate in the program by agreeing to conduct a comprehensive self-
assessment of their security and enhance their supply chain security using guidelines set by 
customs and trade community.  By participating in C-TPAT such “trusted” partners may 
experience reduced US port inspections.  Furthermore, most US and Canadian ports have been 
equipped with radiation detectors and gamma-ray inspection devices to allow customs officials 
to quickly check container contents against the filed manifest. 
Recently, the US has been calling for changes in container security such that all boxes entering 
the US will have to be inspected prior to entry into the country (Kulisch, 2007b). This implies 
individual inspection at the port of origin.  Alternatively, non-inspected containers could be off 
loaded in Canadian ports, inspected through the radiation and gamma ray portals installed in 
container terminals and then forwarded to the US.  This proposed onerous US inspection might 
well provide a future opportunity for Canadian ports.  
It is not beyond reason to expect that American and likely, Canadian security agencies would 
prefer to have containers offloaded and inspected in a non-urban setting to avoid the possibility 
of a terrorist act occurring in a densely populated area (the location of most major American and 
Canadian ports).  In this case, establishing major container transshipment hubs in more isolated 
areas may make sense.  Not only could such a facility serve mega-sized container ships for 
transshipment to inland and coastal ports, it would provide a relatively remote location for 
intensive security pre-clearance of containers prior to arriving at their final North American 
destinations.  Several Canadian deep-water ports on both coasts can meet these security 
criteria. 
Urban and Environmental Constraints 
A major trend impacting port facilities located in urban areas is the public’s growing demand to 
access and use waterfront lands for purposes other than commercial marine cargo handling.  In 
ports around the world, politicians, municipal officials and citizen groups are exerting pressure to 
convert port lands to alternative, urban-oriented uses.   
Today’s post-industrial society is demanding the development of waterfront condominiums, 
walking trails, cafés and boutique shopping areas in place of under-used, industrial port lands 
(Ircha, 2002).  Initially the proponents of such urban oriented waterfront development welcome 
the presence of busy terminals and an active harbour area, but often they soon tire of the 
ongoing noise (particularly in the evening and night time hours), dust, air emissions from port 
equipment and ships, light spillage from the terminal, truck and rail traffic and other detrimental 
aspects of major commercial cargo-handling operations.  This leads to pressure being mounted 
to constrain commercial terminals by limiting their hours of operation, reorienting dockside 
lighting, and restricting truck traffic.  In the extreme, marine terminals are forced to shut down 
and move their operations to more remote locations.  This phenomenon can be seen in Sydney 








Australia where, over the years, various port operations have been curtailed and relocated to 
nearby Botany Bay (Ircha, 2000).  The result is that Sydney Harbour has become known 
worldwide as an attractive tourist and recreational facility.  But this tourism development came 
at a cost to its original marine terminal operators.   
This post-industrial trend for the conversion of waterfront lands to urban oriented uses is 
occurring in many of the world’s major ports.  For example, there is pressure for the Port of 
Vancouver to curtail its terminal operations in the Burrard Inlet as the city’s “cappuccino crowd” 
seeks additional waterfront lands for alternative urban uses.  In part, the port has responded to 
these pressures by developing its major container terminal expansions at Deltaport on Roberts 
Bank, far from the city centre.  Vancouver, like other major Canadian ports has converted some 
of its under-used port lands to public parks to provide community access to the waterfront. 
To accommodate post-industrial society demands, many ports are incorporating sustainability 
as one of their key goals.  In this context, sustainability refers to “balancing the financial, social 
and environmental needs… and integrating that balance into day-to-day business activities” 
(Nagle, 2007).  Sustainability reflects the ports’ recognition that their role goes beyond marine 
cargo handling to being good corporate citizens focusing on “people, planet and profits” (Scott, 
2007/08).  As an example, the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority is reinforcing its sustainability 
initiatives in environmental and community relations with the recent appointment of a Chief 
Sustainability Officer at a vice-presidential level. 
From an environmental perspective, pressure is mounting on ships and ports from various 
sources, including the International Maritime Organization, to take steps to reduce their carbon 
footprint.  Part of the current concern arises from a recent study on shipping by the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change which calculates that the annual air emissions 
from the world fleet has reached 1.12 billion tonnes of CO2 or nearly 4.5 percent of the global 
amount.  This is almost three times the previously estimated amount.  The study further showed 
maritime CO2 emissions could rise by 30 percent by 2020.  As stated by the Chair of IPCC, 
“[t]his is a clear failure of the system.  The shipping industry has so far escaped publicity.  It has 
been left out of the climate change discussions.  I hope [shipping emissions] will be included in 
the next UN agreement” (Vidal, 2008). 
Increased attention from the environmental community will continue to pressure the shipping 
industry and ports to tackle rapid remedial actions to reduce their emissions and other polluting 
activities.  Many steps are being taken such as: improving the fuel efficiency of ships, using 
lower sulfur content fuels, traveling at slower speeds, undertaking hull treatments to improve 
speed and efficiency, experimenting with supplementary propulsion such as the use of kites, 
and various port initiatives. 
The Norwegian government has introduced a NOx  (nitrous oxides) tax on shipping.  Today, 
ships entering Norwegian waters pay a tax of NOK15 (about $2.70) per kg/NOx emitted.  Other 
Baltic states are considering the concept as a means of reducing NOx  emissions in sensitive 
environmental areas (Wheater, 2008).  Given growing environmental concerns about shipping, 
such taxes on emissions could become a common feature in the future adding further to the 
costs of shipping.  The US Environmental Protection Agency has proposed a regulation 
significantly limiting sulfur, nitrogen oxide and particulate matter emissions from ships in a two-








step process by 2012 and 2016 (Johnson, 2008).  The State of California has introduced 
legislation to ensure ships burn clean fuel within 24 miles of the shoreline. 
The alternative to taxation and outright prohibition is the provision of subsidies and incentives to 
encourage the use of lower sulfur (cleaner) fuels to reduce harmful emissions. Such steps were 
initially taken by the Port of Rotterdam in 1994 with its Green Award Program whereby certified 
“green’ ships receive reductions in harbour fees.  The Green Award concept has spread to other 
ports.  In 2007, the Green Award Foundation entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Association of Canadian Port Authorities to work with Transport Canada to initiate the 
program in Canadian ports.  The Vancouver Fraser Port Authority has already introduced a 
three-tier harbour dues program providing discounts to ships burning lower sulfur fuel.   
In addition to using cleaner fuels, major container shipping lines are considering slower 
steaming schedules to reduce fuel consumption.  Such slow steaming leads to substantial 
reductions in fuel consumption.  Some estimates suggest that a 10 percent speed reduction can 
cut fuels and emission by 20 percent.  However, such reduced speeds may lead shippers to 
deploy more ships on key routes to maintain service levels.  As suggested by the Chair of the 
International Bunker Industry Association, “[s]low steaming sounds commercially attractive, but 
beware.  Such is the level of demand for rapid cargo transportation that slower ships are likely 
to result in demand for still more ships, which in turn will actually increase fuel consumption” 
(Fredriksen, 2008). 
Other steps being taken by shipping lines to reduce their carbon footprint include ensuring their 
hulls and propellers are clean to improve fuel and operating efficiency and using supplementary 
propulsion systems such as “sky sails” or kites to offset conventional fuel sources. 
On the shore side, ports are taking steps to reduce air emissions from ships and cargo-handling 
equipment.  In several major ports, provisions are being made to support “cold-ironing” or the 
provision of shore power for ships tied alongside.  Shore power enables ships to shut down their 
generators leading to reduced emissions in the harbour area (however, there may still be 
emissions at the more remote power generating site).  In 2004, the Port of Los Angeles opened 
the first container terminal using Alternative Maritime Power (AMP).  Many shipping lines have 
committed to retrofitting their vessels with the onboard equipment required to hook up to AMP 
(Wheater, 2008).  In addition, the port of Los Angeles is considering developing a 10-megawatt 
solar array to supplement traditional power sources in supplying its AMP system. (Nall, 2007). 
Various ports have taken steps to retrofit or re-equip their onshore container handling 
equipment to reduce emissions through the use of alternative fuels such as liquefied natural 
gas.  For example, the port of Long Beach has initiated a Clean Trucks Program for 
modernizing and replacing the ports’ truck fleet within four years.  This program includes a $1.6 
billion subsidy program to finance the lease or purchase of clean trucks.  It is expected that the 
program will replace 16,800 older drayage trucks in Long Beach by 2012. 
Ports and shipping continually face new challenges.  In recent years pressure has been 
mounting on the industry to convert waterfront lands to non-marine cargo handling activities and 
reducing the air emissions and other pollutants being created by the maritime industry.  In the 
latter case, steps are being taken to reduce the industry’s carbon footprint, but such steps 








inevitably come with added costs which will eventually be borne by consumers in the higher cost 
of goods transported by sea. 
Canadian Port Opportunities 
In 2006, Canadian container ports handled some 4.2 million TEU (AAPA, 2007).  
Canadian container throughput represents about 1 percent of the world’s container traffic of 
428.8 million TEU in 2006 (Degerlund, 2008).  Assuming the forecast of a 75% increase in TEU 
throughput in North America over the next ten years is correct, there will be a requirement for 
Canadian ports to handle a minimum throughput of about 7 million TEU in 2015.  The actual 
demand could be higher as some US ports may not be able to expand their container handling 
facilities to serve mega-sized container ships.  In an earlier study, the possible location of major 
container transshipment hub ports on the Canadian West and East Coasts was reviewed.  This 
study suggested that tomorrow’s major hub transshipment facilities could be located at Prince 
Rupert and Vancouver on the West Coast and in Canso and Halifax on the East Coast.  Steps 
are currently being taken in these two West Coast ports to address the issue of increasing 
container trade.   
West Coast Ports 
The Port of Vancouver is actively engaged in upgrading and expanding its container handling 
terminals to address both current capacity issues and meet the growing demands of tomorrow.  
In a recent presentation, the Vancouver Port Authority’s President Captain Gordon Houston 
stated there are five separate container projects either underway or being planned in 
Vancouver.  These include adding a third berth at the Deltaport Container Terminal, developing 
a new additional three berth terminal at Deltaport (under environmental review), and in the 
Burrard Inlet upgrading and enhancing Centerm and Vanterm by replacing container lift 
equipment to achieve higher densities and greater productivity as well as the possible 
conversion of Lynnterm, a forest products terminal located on the north shore, into a container 
terminal.  These upgrades and new terminals could add a further 2.5 million TEU capacity to 
Vancouver. 
Prince Rupert is now operating the first phase of its new 2 million TEU container handling 
facility. The Port of Prince Rupert is ideally located on deep water relatively close to the northern 
Pacific great-circle route from Asia to North America.  Prince Rupert’s location places it closer to 
Asian ports than any other North American facility.  In addition, the port is served by a currently 
under-used rail system connecting Prince Rupert to the continent’s industrial heartland.  Prince 
Rupert’s strategic location for the movement of containers on larger container ships was 
recognized early on.  More recent major public and private investment in developing the port’s 
first phase container terminal will ease some of the pressure on congested West Coast 
container ports in getting Asian and Chinese containers into North America.  Further 
development of the Prince Rupert container terminal facilities will enhance trade and contribute 
to local economic development.   









The growth of the global economy was underpinned by the lower freight rates generated from 
technological developments such as containerization in the seaborne trade.  Remaining 
competitive by offering lower freight rates led to the development of ever-larger ships seeking 
economies of scale.  This is particularly evident in the container trades with the recent launch of 
mega-sized container ships of 12,000+ TEU capacities. 
NAFTA led to a focused interest by the public and private sector on developing north-south 
trade corridors.  As corridor discussions matured, it became evident that major ports on or near 
these major trade corridors played a key role as gateways connecting North American markets 
to the global economy.  The focus of trade corridors and gateways evolved into considering a 
fully integrated intermodal transport system as part of a comprehensive logistics chain.  The 
Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative provides Canada’s first comprehensive and integrated 
transportation corridor and gateway strategy based on a full public-private partnership.  This 
form of integrated transportation strategy (port and rail) led to the development of Prince 
Rupert’s success in developing its initial container terminal. 
The continued development of Canadian Port Authorities is constrained to a degree by the 
Canada Marine Act 1998 and other federal legislation.  CPAs are not able to respond quickly to 
emerging business opportunities as they are still tied to various federal regulations and 
requirements.  The Canadian ports situation is considerably different than the business-like 
environment of their US competitors who typically have considerable freedom to take action to 
capture emerging opportunities.  The liberalizing recommendations of the Canada Marine Act 
Review Panel need to be adopted by the federal government to enable CPAs to act as 
businesses rather than as mere federal agents. Recent CMA amendments are a major step in 
this direction.  
There are opportunities for Canadian ports to serve North America as hub container ports on 
both coasts.  Ongoing congestion and capacity constraints in major US ports could lead to the 
development of more remote Canadian alternatives – Prince Rupert’s container terminal 
initiative offers a prime example of this approach.  Other Canadian ports could serve continental 
container trade such as expansions at Vancouver, Halifax, Saint John and new container 
terminal developments in the Strait of Canso and Sept Îles. 
There are several key elements required for a port’s success in the container trade.  The first is 
geographic location.  Ports seeking to grow to hub terminal status must be located on or near 
the main shipping routes and connected to effective trade corridors.  Few shipping lines can 
afford to divert their ships to serve isolated ports, unless these ports act as the terminus of the 
pendulum swing from Asia to North America (on either the West or East Coasts).  However, as 
the growing need for port reliability is causing shipping lines to diversify their ports of call, there 
will likely be more than a single hub terminal on either coast’s port range.   
Secondly, ports seeking to serve mega-sized container ships must be accessible to them.  This 
means they must have water depths of 15 meters or more, appropriately sized turning basins 
and navigation channels to serve such ships.   








Thirdly, container hub ports must have and maintain a reputation for continued high productivity 
in terms of ship turn-around time and truck/rail car turn-around time.  Such productivity implies 
having spare capacity in terms of container yard storage and lifting equipment, including ship-to-
shore gantry cranes and terminal equipment along with a stable and reliable labour force 
working 24/7.  Productivity also implies port flexibility – the ability to rapidly adopt new and 
changing technology to maintain high throughput levels.  Flexibility also means coping 
effectively with landside pressures to constrain terminal operations and to convert underused 
port lands to other urban oriented uses.  Dealing with the community and environmental 
consequences of a major container terminal requires tact and diplomacy on the part of the 
operators and port officials.  Creative steps are needed to offset the community’s constraining 
criticisms. 
Fourthly, container hub ports need efficient intermodal linkages (road, rail and short sea 
shipping) to ensure containers are moved through the terminal quickly to reach their final inland 
destinations.   
Finally, these key elements must be achieved economically such that the rates and tariffs 
charged for container moves through the port and terminal remain competitive.  Achieving these 
key elements is not an easy task, but they are essential if Canadian container ports wish to 
remain key players in the continued development of the North American economy.  
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